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1Abstract
Clearinghouses support ﬁnancial trades by keeping records of transactions and by providing
liquidity through short-term credit that is periodically cleared by participants. We study
eﬃcient clearing arrangements for formal exchanges, where traders must clear with a clear-
inghouse, and for over-the-counter (OTC) markets, where trades can be cleared bilaterally.
When clearing is costly, we show that it can be eﬃcient to subsidize the clearing process for
OTC transactions by charging a higher price for the clearing of transactions in exchanges.
This necessitates a clearinghouse that operates across both markets. As a clearinghouse
oﬀers credit, intertemporal incentives are needed in order to ensure settlement. An increase
in the costs of liquidity provision worsens the incentives to settle. Hence, when liquidity
costs increase, concerns about default must lead to a tightening of liquidity provision.
Keywords: Clearing, OTC vs. Exchanges, Private Information, Liquidity Costs, Default
JEL Classiﬁcation: G14, G23, E42
21 Introduction
Exchanges formalize and standardize trading. They also oﬀer another crucial service: the
clearing of ﬁnancial transactions. Clearing is usually performed within a single clearinghouse
associated with the exchange. The clearinghouse is the neuralgic centre of the exchange. It
gathers information on trades, which it then uses to calculate the resulting net positions of
participants. It adjusts the exposure of participants by granting short-term credit. Finally, it
ensures that the resulting positions are properly settled. Given the information on hand, the
clearinghouse can regulate and inﬂuence trading activities in order to limit the probability
of participants defaulting. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways. For example, the
clearinghouse can adjust the frequency of settlement, impose certain trading limits, or vary
collateral requirements. As pointed out by Bernanke (1990), given the immense volume of
transactions involved, designing the rules of operation for clearinghouses is important for
eﬃcient trading.
Somewhat surprisingly, centralized clearinghouses (CH) are not in operation in some
important markets, such as over-the-counter (OTC) markets. Instead, trades in these mar-
kets are usually cleared bilaterally and on an ad-hoc basis. More recently, however, many
have called for the creation of a CH on the grounds that it will achieve more transparency
and improve the eﬃciency of trading by reducing operational and settlement risk.1 As a
response, some exchange clearinghouses plan to engage in the clearing of transactions in
certain segments of OTC markets in the near future.2
The operation of a CH will necessarily diﬀer across these markets. A CH operating
in a centralized exchange inevitably becomes aware of all realized trades since they are
automatically processed and cleared within the system. In this sense, trades in exchanges
can be monitored by the CH. On the other hand, trades conducted OTC can be cleared
1There is an on-going discussion on how to ensure proper risk management practices in derivatives markets
through formal clearing arrangements (see, e.g., Geithner, 2006 or Counter-Party Risk Management Policy
Group, 2005).
2See, for example, The Clearing Corporation (2008) for a short discussion of the clearinghouse introduction
in the OTC market for credit default swaps. NYMEX is in the process of oﬀering clearing services for some
OTC derivatives markets.
3and settled bilaterally. Therefore, trades in OTC markets are non-monitored: as traders can
always choose to trade and settle bilaterally, they can misrepresent their true exposures by
settling only a share of the trades through the CH. In other words, in an OTC market the
CH will have to provide incentives for traders to clear their trade through the CH.
A CH aggregates transactions and, thus, transforms bilateral exposures into multilateral
ones. This allows the CH to defer settlement and, hence, to economize on settlement costs.
In this sense, a CH is subject to economies of scale in settling transactions. How much it
can defer settlement depends, of course, on the participants’ incentives to default on their
outstanding positions. Thus, a key trade-oﬀ for designing an optimal clearing arrangement
is between providing liquidity to participants in the form of credit at low cost, while at the
same time ensuring proper incentives for carrying out and settling transactions. In contrast,
when OTC trades clear bilaterally, costs are incurred per trade and immediately.
This raises the question of how a CH can support eﬃcient trade in ﬁnancial markets by
economizing on settlement costs while, at the same time, providing incentives to settle the
obligations arising from transactions. Can a CH operate in OTC markets and, if so, is it
beneﬁcial if it also operates in an exchange? Furthermore, how do the costs associated with
clearing and settlement inﬂuence the amount of liquidity that is optimally granted by the
CH?3
As traders have no choice but to settle through the CH if they trade in the exchange,
we ﬁnd that a CH operating in an exchange can use its monitoring power to extract surplus
from transactions. For a CH to clear OTC transactions, however, it needs to oﬀer a cost
advantage that will be passed on to traders in the OTC market, as such traders have the
option to bypass the CH and clear bilaterally.
If the cost advantage per OTC transaction is too small, a CH that only operates on the
OTC market is not attainable. A joint CH for both markets, however, can extract surplus
from its exchange clearing and use it to subsidize clearing costs for OTC transactions. By
3The optimal design of a CH will also depend on a number of other factors such as the exact nature of
the ﬁnancial transactions cleared, heterogeneity among traders, or concerns about contagion if collateral is
fungible across markets. We will abstract from these issues in what follows.
4inducing OTC trades to clear within the CH, the CH increases cost-savings for each OTC
transaction. Due to increasing returns, a CH also saves on overall settlement costs and,
hence, increases overall welfare. In a broader context, our ﬁndings suggest that it is optimal
to set interdependent clearing rules across markets whenever information on trades diﬀers
across these markets.
Conditions in the OTC market will determine whether it is feasible for a CH to operate
across markets. We demonstrate that the larger the value of OTC transactions, the less
viable a CH is in the OTC market. This result depends not only on the surplus generated by
OTC trades, but also on the market power of sellers in the OTC markets. When sellers have
more market power, buyers have to pay more for a given transaction. Thus, the CH faces
a tighter default constraint when settlement is deferred and sellers’ market power increases.
If one thinks of dealers as OTC sellers with a relatively large market power, this implies
that clearing OTC trades through a CH will be more diﬃcult when dealers represent a large
share of OTC trades.
How do settlement costs inﬂuence these results?4 The risk of a settlement default in-
creases with the cost of settling obligations. It is, thus, optimal for the CH to tighten credit
in order to neutralize the increase in default risk – or, in other words, to tighten liquidity
provision when the costs of providing such liquidity increase.5 Hence, an increase in settle-
ment costs results in a lower volume of transactions. More interestingly, it is optimal for the
CH to decrease the size of transactions and, at the same time, to increase the frequency of
settlement. Thus, while liquidity decreases, the overall costs of liquidity in the CH increase.
The reason is intuitive. An increase in the ﬁxed costs associated with settlement also in-
creases the incentives to default. To balance this risk, the CH must ensure that participants
have the incentive to settle. This is achieved by lowering the total credit available in the sys-
4For evidence on strategic settlement failures related to the actual settlement costs, see, for example,
Garbade and Fleming (2002).
5There is some recent literature studying liquidity (credit) provision in payment systems. Examples
include Martin (2004), who studies the optimal pricing of intra-day credit in the presence of moral hazard,
and Martin and McAndrews (2007), who analyze the use of a queueing mechanism for economizing in
liquidity costs. Rather than restricting attention to a particular form of credit provision, we analyze the
general interaction between credit and liquidity provision in a payment or settlement system.
5tem.6 To our knowledge, this result is not present in the existing literature, which does not
consider endogenous incentive eﬀects and simply trades oﬀ exogenous default costs against
the opportunity costs of funding liquidity.7
To obtain these results, we build on the framework of a payment system developed by
Koeppl, Monnet and Temzelides (2007). Traders are randomly matched, and a transaction
can occur if one trader has a preference for holding an asset (say, a contract), while the other
trader is willing to sell (write) a contract. For concreteness, we call the two traders buyer
and seller, respectively. Furthermore, we assume that there is an optimal transaction size
and that there are immediate beneﬁts and costs of a transaction for the buyer and the seller,
respectively.
We model the CH as an authority that records transactions and provides credit. Writing
a contract requires a payment from the buyer to the seller, and the CH assigns individual
balances and speciﬁes how these balances are updated given the participants’ trading his-
tories. Sellers are rewarded for writing a contract through balance increases, while buyers
incur costs through balance decreases. These rewards and costs materialize when the result-
ing balances, which summarize the traders’ credit positions, are settled with the CH.8 Since
settlement is costly, participants need an incentive to settle their outstanding balances. As
a result, the CH might have to limit the overall volume of transactions or, equivalently, the
total available supply of liquidity.
We further assume that a fraction of trades are monitored by the CH, while others are
6This is reminiscent of results in the literature on real time gross versus net settlement systems. In a real
time gross settlement system (RTGS), trades are settled at the time of the transaction. This imposes large
liquidity requirements on banks. As shown by Kahn, McAndrews and Roberds (2003), such requirements
can potentially create gridlocks in the system. Central banks remedy this problem by providing (costly)
intra-day credit. Kahn and Roberds (2001) argue that the main costs of RTGS systems are associated with
the cost of obtaining credit from the central bank. Net settlement, whereby obligations are netted and then
settled, oﬀers banks short-run credit automatically and, hence, introduces the potential for default. Kahn
and Roberds (1998) show that this incentive should be seriously taken into account when considering the
optimal payment system. Such a system must balance saving on liquidity costs against risking default when
extending credit.
7See, for example, Berger et al. (1996). Fujiki et al. (1999) provide an early study of default in payment
systems from an incentive perspective.
8One can think, for example, of a large-value system where all intra-day positions are settled in the
overnight market using funds obtained through interbank lending.
6not.9 We identify the ﬁrst with trades in an exchange and the second with OTC trades.
Upon default, traders are excluded from clearing through the CH. Hence, they can no longer
carry out trades in the exchange. However, they can still participate in OTC transactions
which are then cleared bilaterally. Finally, we assume that there are diﬀerences in clearing
costs. A CH incurs an aggregate ﬁxed cost whenever it requires its participants to settle,
whereas each OTC trade is settled at an individual cost.
Subsidizing OTC trades is necessary since individual traders in these markets do not take
into account the positive externality from clearing through the CH. Indeed, we demonstrate
that, under certain conditions, it is optimal for the CH to operate across both OTC markets
and exchanges. This is because a CH can extract surplus from clearing in the exchange in
order to cross-subsidize the clearing of OTC transactions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our model and discusses trading
and settlement in OTC transactions and in exchange trades. In Section 3 we analyze how
information is used within a clearinghouse and demonstrate that it can be optimal for a clear-
inghouse to operate across OTC markets and the exchange. Section 4 studies how liquidity
costs aﬀect the optimal transaction volume. In Section 5 we further discuss clearinghouses
and their costs, and we discuss some of the limitations of our analysis. The Appendix con-
tains our proofs and introduces a continuous-time extension of the model used in Section
4.
2 Financial Trades and Settlement
2.1 The Environment
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived traders. Time is denoted by t = 0,1,2,.... Traders
discount the future according to a common discount factor β ∈ (0,1). We assume a periodic
pattern of length n. Each transaction stage, consisting of a sequence of n bilateral trans-
9For some early work on issues of private information and payments, see Aiyagari and Williamson (2000)
and Temzelides and Williamson (2001).
7actions, is followed by a settlement stage.10 Discounting applies after each period, except
between the last transaction stage and the settlement stage. We describe the transaction
stage and the settlement stage in turns.
Traders are randomly and bilaterally matched in each round of the transaction stage.
A trader can either sell or buy contracts to/from the trader he is matched with, each with
probability γ. Thus, during each transaction stage, a trader is in a trade meeting with
probability 2γ, either as a seller or as a buyer. We assume that the possibility of trading is
private information for the traders.
There are two types of trade meetings in each transaction stage. Trades can either take
place in an exchange, with probability α, or “over-the-counter” (OTC), with probability
1 − α. All contracts that are traded in the transaction stage are perfectly divisible and in
zero net supply between the two counter-parties.
If a trader writes or sells q ≥ 0 contracts traded in the exchange, he incurs a one-time
cost c(q) for holding this position. If a trader buys q ≥ 0 contracts in the exchange, he
enjoys a one-time beneﬁt equal to u(q). Similarly, in OTC transactions, we assume a cost
σc(q) for the seller and a respective beneﬁt σu(q) for the buyer, where σ ≥ 1. We assume
that u(q) is increasing and concave, while c(q) is increasing and convex. Furthermore, we
restrict attention to trades that are stationary and symmetric, and assume that there is a
unique optimal transaction size that we denote by q∗ > 0, reﬂecting the maximum surplus
from trading. Since we concentrate on this quantity for most of the paper, we will simplify
notation by letting u denote u(q∗) and c denote c(q∗).
We will use this setup to study ﬁnancial transactions. A buyer would like to take a
long position in a contract, since he derives some beneﬁts from it. For example, the buyer
might need to purchase the contract in order to hedge, or he might wish to take a position
in a customized derivative or futures contract. By writing the contract, the seller is willing
to take the opposite short position. Creating this position, however, is costly. Writing an
10Lagos and Wright (2005) introduced similar periodic trading patterns in monetary models. The con-
tinuum assumption precludes aggregate risk. Issues related to optimal market design in the presence of
aggregate risk are of great interest, but beyond the scope of this paper.
8option or futures contract implies no cap on the losses the issuer can incur. Hence, traders
are unlikely to take any arbitrary high position in such contracts. Thus, there is an optimal
size for the trade, with quantity q∗ maximizing the joint surplus, irrespective of the type of
trade. The assumption that σ ≥ 1 simply scales up the surplus from OTC trades. Still,
while traders prefer OTC contracts, they are also more expensive to write.11
To analyze diﬀerent clearing arrangements, we assume that information for the CH varies
across transactions. First, recall that the possibility to trade is always private information for
traders. When a trade takes place in the exchange (probability α), the CH can monitor the
trade; i.e., it observes the traders’ identity and their position with the CH, if any. Trades that
take place in an exchange are always cleared through the CH.12 In an exchange, clearing is not
a choice for the trading parties, but part of the transaction according to the clearinghouse
rules. When a trade is OTC (probability 1 − α), the trade cannot be monitored by the
CH. Such a transaction is only observable to the CH if the traders submit it for clearing.
Hence, OTC traders have a choice over the clearing arrangement – clearing bilaterally or via
a clearinghouse. We study these diﬀerences in more detail next.13
2.2 Clearinghouses
We begin this section by introducing the idea of a clearinghouse (CH). A CH records past
transactions by assigning balances to traders. In addition, it speciﬁes rules for how these
balances are updated according to reported or observed transactions. We will refer to this
set of rules as the Payment System associated with the CH.
The settlement of obligations (i.e., the actual payment) arising from ﬁnancial transactions
usually occurs at a later time than the transaction itself. In our model, settlement occurs
periodically through trading a general asset during the settlement stage. Delivering ` units
11Here we take the stance that an OTC contract is better suited to the buyer’s needs than a centralized
contract. The analysis would go through if we were to assume σ < 1 instead.
12This is reminiscent of anonymous computerized trading where settlement is automatically enacted after
a trade.
13There are other diﬀerences between trading in OTC markets and trading in centralized markets (for
example, in the way prices are determined, and in how trades are intermediated and executed). We abstract
from these aspects in order to focus on the eﬀects of diﬀerences in the information structure.
9of a general asset implies a cost of −`, while obtaining ` units gives a beneﬁt `. Thus, trading
this general ﬁnancial asset is zero-sum and does not directly increase welfare. Nonetheless,
actual settlement usually involves opportunity or funding costs that go beyond the direct
cost of payments. In order to capture these costs in our model, we introduce an aggregate
(average) resource cost δ > 0 whenever settlement occurs. This cost has to be paid in units
of the general asset.
The settlement stage is not subject to informational frictions and is centralized; i.e., we
model it as a direct transaction between traders and the CH. Balances are denominated in
terms of the general asset, with d units of balances indicating a claim to receive d units of the
general asset. Traders with low balances can increase their balances by delivering the asset,
while those with high balances can reduce them by obtaining the general asset. Finally, we
assume that the CH can permanently prevent traders who do not settle their balances from
using its facility for settling trades in the future. This automatically excludes traders from
all trades in the exchange.14
Formally, consider the problem of a trader during settlement at time t. Let Vt(dt) denote
his value function if he exits the last period in the transactions stage with a balance dt ∈ R.
The problem of the trader is given by
Vt(dt) = max
`t,b dt
−` + βEtvt+1(b dt) (1)
subject to
b dt = dt + `t (2)
b dt ≥ min{0,dt}, (3)
where Etvt+1(b dt) denotes the expected future value of a trader who exits the settlement stage
with balance b dt. The inequality constraint (3) rules out borrowing from the CH in order
14This punishment might seem unrealistically harsh. Alternatively, we could assume that traders that
default are allowed to participate only in certain trades, or that they are allowed to re-enter the system after
a few periods of exclusion. In general, increasing the value of the outside option will increase the probability
of default. Nonetheless, our results will remain qualitatively unchanged under any such speciﬁcation of the
outside option.
10to consume the general asset. Notice that Vt is linear in dt, which greatly simpliﬁes our
analysis.
During the transaction stage, traders are matched bilaterally in each period. Traders
in the exchange who choose to trade are instructed to exchange a quantity qt(dt,d0
t) of the
asset. Similarly, OTC traders can choose to identify themselves to the CH as being in a
potential trade meeting. The potential seller is then instructed to sell ¯ qt(dt,d0
t) of the asset
to the potential buyer. Note that these quantities can depend on both traders’ balances.15
Upon receiving the reports on OTC trades and the asset trading in the exchange, the
CH makes an adjustment, Xt(dt,d0
t) ∈ R to each trader’s balance. Recall that, in any given
period, a trader can be a buyer, a seller, or he might not trade at all. In addition, each
transaction is either monitored by the exchange, or is an OTC transaction submitted for
central clearing. This results in six possible adjustments; i.e., Xt ∈ {Lt,Kt,Bt, ¯ Lt, ¯ Kt, ¯ Bt}.
More precisely, Lt(Kt) is the adjustment for a buyer (seller) in the exchange, with the
variables ¯ Lt, ¯ Kt deﬁned for OTC transactions. The remaining adjustments refer to the case
of a trader who reports not having any trade opportunity. We can then formally deﬁne the
CH’s rules.16
Deﬁnition 1. A Payment System is an array
St(dt,d
0
t) = {Lt,Kt,Bt,qt, ¯ Lt, ¯ Kt, ¯ Bt, ¯ qt}, for all t.
We restrict attention to payment systems (PS) that are incentive feasible. We term a PS
incentive feasible if (i) all traders have an incentive to participate in each transaction and do
not default in the settlement stage, (ii) all OTC and exchange traders truthfully reveal their
type, and (iii) the CH breaks even. The last requirement implies that, in each settlement
15Throughout the paper, we apply a “mechanism design” approach to payments. Thus, when a buyer and
a seller transact, it is as if the CH proposes both the quantity traded and the implicit price. Of course, we
ensure that the prescribed trades are incentive compatible for the participating traders. In fact, we require
that the realized trades are eﬃcient. Our analysis, thus, abstracts from the implementation issue of how
such trades would materialize in an actual market. We justify restricting attention to eﬃcient trading by
simply postulating that traders will ﬁnd a way to explore all possible gains from their transactions.
16In principle, the payment system could also be a function of the distribution of balances (see Koeppl,
Monnet and Temzelides (2008)). This, however, is not important in our context.
11stage, Z
d
(b dt − dt)dΨt + δ = 0, (4)
where Ψt is the distribution of balances across traders at t.17
To formulate incentive feasibility, we ﬁrst describe the traders’ value functions during
the transaction stage. Recall that there are n bilateral rounds (one in each period) between
settlement stages. To ease notation, we denote the current-period immediate return in period
t by f(Xt), where Xt ∈ {Lt,Kt,Bt, ¯ Lt, ¯ Kt, ¯ Bt}. Thus, f
¡¯ Lt
¢







= 0. Similarly, for monitored trades, f(Lt) = u(qt), f(Kt) = −c(qt) and f (Bt) =
0.
If the last settlement stage occurred in period t, the value function during each round s,





E [f(Xt+s) + βEt+s[vt+s+1(dt+s−1 + Xt+s)]]dΨt+s−1, (5)
where E denotes the expectation over the meeting the trader will be in during the current





E [f(Xt+n) + V (dt+n−1 + Xt+n)]dΨt+n−1. (6)
Traders may decide to leave the CH at any point. They can choose to default and take
the outside option of trading only OTC in the future. The value of this outside option, V0,
is endogenous and will be derived later. For the settlement stage, we have the following no
default constraint:
V (dt+n−1 + Xt+n) ≥ βV0. (7)
Of course, traders also need an incentive to participate in clearing through the CH during
17This immediately implies that in each settlement stage the net production of the general asset covers
the settlement costs; i.e.,
R
dt `tdΨt = −δ.
12the transaction stages. Thus, if the last settlement stage occurred at t, we require that
f(Xt+s) + βEt+s[vt+s+1(dt+s−1 + Xt+s)] ≥ g (Xt+s) + βV0, (8)
for all Xt+s, and all s = 1,...,n − 1. Finally, for s = n we require that
f(Xt+n) + V (dt+n−1 + Xt+n) ≥ g (Xt+n) + βV0 (9)
for all Xt+n. Note that g(X) is the current period return of the outside option and depends
on the type of meeting a trader is in. For OTC transactions we have g( ¯ X) ≥ 0, reﬂecting the
fact that traders can still trade OTC with bilateral clearing. Here, the CH takes the terms
of such trades as given, which pins down the current period return of the outside option. On
the other hand, traders in the exchange need to clear through the CH. If they choose not to
trade, we simply have g(X) = 0.
Traders can also mis-report their transactions. Assuming that the last settlement stage
occurred at time t, a PS is incentive compatible during each round s, s = 1,...,n − 1, of
the current transactions stage if
f (Xt+s)+βEt+s[vt+s+1(dt+s−1 +Xt+s)] ≥ f(Bt+s)+g (Xt+s)+βEt+s[vt+s+1(dt+s−1 +Bt+s)].
(10)
For s = n, incentive compatibility requires that, for all Xt+n,
f(Xt+n) + V (dt+n−1 + Xt+n) ≥ f(Bt+n) + g (Xt+n) + V (dt+n−1 + Bt+n). (11)
In words, these constraints require that reporting the true state and clearing through the
CH gives at least as high an expected utility as trading OTC or not trading in the exchange.
Notice that a trader can misrepresent a potential transaction by indicating to the CH that he
did not have an opportunity to trade. The value of lying depends again on whether a trader
faces a potential OTC transaction with bilateral clearing or not (g( ¯ X) ≥ 0 vs. g(X) = 0).
13To conclude this section, it is useful to specify a particular type of PS that we will use
extensively in what follows. A PS is simple if balance adjustments do not depend on the
traders’ current balances. Hence, a simple PS does not condition on a trader’s history. A




Xt+kn = X, (13)
where X ∈ {L,K,B, ¯ L, ¯ K, ¯ B}, s = 1,...,n, and k ∈ N. In the above expressions, t
represents the date of settlement. In words, adjusting for discounting, a repeated PS imposes
the same balance adjustments in each period of the transactions cycle. In what follows, we
shall concentrate on SRPS and will simply refer to them as PS.
2.3 OTC Trades and Bilateral Settlement
We now determine the outside option when trading OTC. If presented with an opportunity
to trade OTC, traders can choose to remain anonymous to the CH. Then the buyer and seller
engage in Nash bargaining to determine a spot price and the size of the transaction. This
trade is then immediately settled by producing the general asset on the spot.18 Immediate
settlement, however, imposes a ﬁxed cost, τ – without loss of generality imposed on buyers
– where τ ≤ σ (u − c).
Denoting the relative bargaining power of buyers by η ∈ [0,1], the traders agree on the
quantity q and the price p so as to solve19
max
p,q
(σu(q) − p − τ)
η (p − σc(q))
1−η . (14)
18Due to the random matching friction, traders cannot commit to an action toward each other in the
future. Hence, if the OTC contract is delivered today, settlement must take place on the spot.
19The generalized bargaining problem includes a continuation value for both parties and the outside option
of not trading at all today as a threat point. These are both given by f( ¯ Bt+s)+βEt+s[vt+s+1(dt+s−1+ ¯ Bt+s)]
and therefore cancel out.
14Notice that linearity in the general good causes the surplus to be independent of the bargain-
ing power; i.e., utility is transferable between the buyer and the seller. Hence, as long as the
eﬃcient quantity q∗ is produced, the total surplus is shared proportionally to the bargaining
power, η. The ﬁrst order conditions reﬂect this and are given by
q = q
∗ (15)
p = (1 − η)σu + ησc − (1 − η)τ. (16)
This leads to the current period pay-oﬀs from OTC trades. These are given by g(¯ Lt+s) =
η [σ(u − c) − τ] for buyers and by g( ¯ Kt+s) = (1−η)[σ(u − c) − τ] for sellers, with g( ¯ Bt+s) =
0. Finally, the payoﬀ in autarky, V0, is deﬁned as the expected payoﬀ from trading only
OTC forever,
(1 − β)V0 = (1 − α)γ [σ (u − c) − τ], (17)
and is independent of the bargaining power.20
3 Eﬃcient Use of Information
In the previous section we described the trading environment and possible clearing arrange-
ments. We will now study three diﬀerent scenarios and characterize conditions under which
a payment system can implement the ﬁrst-best allocation, in which the eﬃcient contract q∗
is exchanged in all transactions. Formally, we concentrate on the following.
Deﬁnition 2. A PS is optimal if it is incentive feasible, and if it leads to the eﬃcient level
of asset trading, q∗, in all transactions.
We will ﬁrst study exchange trades (α = 1) and characterize under what speciﬁcations of
20It is useful to diﬀerentiate our setup from the one used by Duﬃe, Garleanu and Pedersen (2005 and
2007) to study OTC markets. Apart from minor modelling diﬀerences, we add settlement as a feature
associated with every transaction, and we concentrate on eﬃcient trading outcomes. Rather than focusing
on a particular trading protocol, we use mechanism design in order to specify a PS that induces traders to
carry out transactions eﬃciently. Thus, we abstract from frictions related to pricing and bargaining, which
are the focus of Duﬃe, et al. (2005 and 2007).
15preferences and costs an optimal payment system exists. We then study the same question
for OTC trades (α = 0). Finally, we investigate the situation where a CH operates across
both markets (α ∈ (0,1)). In the Appendix we oﬀer a brief discussion of the nature of the
constraints a CH faces under a SRPS.
3.1 Simple Repeated Payment Systems
We denote the minimum balance adjustment in any given period by Xmin
t = min{Lt,Kt,Bt, ¯ Lt, ¯ Kt, ¯ Bt}.
We also normalize the required starting balance after the settlement stage in period t to
b dt = 0. This simply implies that we start oﬀ the economy with a zero net position between
the CH and all traders. The CH excludes from future clearing traders who do not reset their
balances to zero in the settlement stage. This implies that the distribution of balances, Ψt,
at the end of each settlement stage is degenerate.




α[γ (Kt+s + Lt+s) + (1 − 2γ)Bt+s] + (1 − α)
£
γ
¡ ¯ Kt+s + ¯ Lt+s
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α[γ (K + L) + (1 − 2γ)B] + (1 − α)
£
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¢





βn (1 − β)
β (1 − βn)
. (19)
Such payment systems are convenient since the linearity of V implies that the incentive
constraints for all s, s = 1,...,n − 1 are fulﬁlled whenever those for s = n hold. Similarly,
all participation constraints are fulﬁlled as long as traders have no incentive to default in the




t+s . This is summarized in the following Lemma. We relegate the proofs
to the Appendix.
16Lemma 3. All incentive constraints are fulﬁlled as long as
f(Kt+n) + Kt+n ≥ f(Bt+n) + Bt+n
f(Lt+n) + Lt+n ≥ f(Bt+n) + Bt+n
f( ¯ Kt+n) − g( ¯ Kt+n) + ¯ Kt+n ≥ f( ¯ Bt+n) + ¯ Bt+n
f(¯ Lt+n) − g(¯ Lt+n) + ¯ Lt+n ≥ f( ¯ Bt+n) + ¯ Bt+n.
Furthermore, all participation constraints hold as long as traders with the worst possible
balance adjustment have no incentive to default in the settlement stage and carry out the












t+s + Xt+n) ≥ g(Xt+n) + βV0,
for all Xt+n.
3.2 A Clearinghouse for the Exchange
We now consider the case where a CH only clears trades that take place in an exchange. This
is equivalent to setting α = 1. The CH needs to ensure that traders in the exchange report
their trading opportunities truthfully. In other words, it needs to adjust settlement balances
in order to elicit truthful revelation. The following result gives necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for this to occur.
Proposition 4. Suppose α = 1. There exists an optimal PS if and only if
β




17The corresponding balance adjustments are given by
Bt+n = Lt+n = −δ(n) − γc
Kt+n = c + Lt+n.
Notice that if n = 0, the condition reads u ≥ c, while if n → ∞ the condition is violated.
Therefore; given u > c, there exists ¯ n ≥ 1 such that the condition holds for all n < ¯ n and
fails otherwise. In other words, if the settlement frequency is suﬃciently high, there is an
optimal PS.
It is instructive to rewrite our condition (20) in Proposition 4 as
β
1 − β
γ(u − c) −
1




The ﬁrst two terms in this expression give the total discounted net present value of the
surplus from staying with the clearinghouse. This consists of the value of being able to
transact in the future, net of the future settlement costs associated with trading. The last
term gives the total outstanding balances for a trader that has consumed in every single
transaction stage throughout the cycle. Hence, the diﬀerence between these terms is the net
beneﬁt from not defaulting for the trader that has the strongest incentive to default. If this
net beneﬁt is positive, all traders will transfer enough of the general asset to the CH to settle
their trades.21
Finally, a comment is in order regarding the optimal payment system. One might have
expected that the balance adjustment if no transaction takes place should be zero (Bt+n = 0).
This would imply that Kt+n = c and Lt+n = −(δ(n)/γ) − c. While there are parameters for
which such a payment system is incentive feasible, our ﬁndings assert that it is not the one
that can implement the eﬃcient transaction size q∗ for the largest set of parameters. Having
21Our approach does not oﬀer a theory of which party in a transaction should cover the settlement costs.
As long as an optimal PS exists, what matters for incentives are the overall balance adjustments (including
costs). Hence, the PS can levy the costs arbitrarily on buyers, sellers, or non-trading members.
18Bt+n < 0 can be interpreted as a ﬁxed membership fee for participating in the CH.22 Our
model can be thought of as providing a possible justiﬁcation for such fees.
3.3 A Clearinghouse for the OTC Market
We now turn to the case where there are only OTC trades (α = 0). The CH faces a
more diﬃcult problem in this case. The reason is that now traders have the option to
clear bilaterally and on the spot at an immediate cost, τ. Thus, since the outside option
for traders has improved relative to exchange trades, the PS must ensure that traders are
willing to clear through the CH rather than bilaterally. We again provide a characterization
of when an optimal payment system through a CH exists.










where p = (1 − η)(σu − τ) + ησc is the price of OTC transactions. The optimal balance
adjustments are given by
¯ Bt+n = ¯ Lt+n = −δ(n) − γp,
¯ Kt+n = ¯ Lt+n + p.
For a CH to be able to operate, it must be the case that immediate bilateral settlement






1 − βn. (23)
This condition compares the costs from the two ways of settling transactions. The left-hand
side expresses the expected net present value of settlement costs when all transactions are
settled OTC. The right-hand is the equivalent expression for settling through the CH. Notice
22See also Monnet and Roberds (2008).
19that for OTC trades, the cost is incurred after every trade, while if clearing occurs through
the CH, the cost is incurred independent of the number of trades. In a stark way, this
captures economies of scale for the CH relative to bilateral clearing. For a CH to be able to
clear OTC trades, it must oﬀer a large enough cost advantage to traders.
3.4 A Joint Clearinghouse: Cross-Subsidizing Transactions
We now investigate the possibility of a clearinghouse that operates across both markets. To
do so, we assume that α ∈ (0,1), so that some transactions take place in an exchange, while
others are OTC. When a CH operates across both markets, it can modify its clearing rules
to aﬀect the incentives to default, depending on where a transaction takes place. This opens
up the possibility of cross-subsidizing diﬀerent transactions in order to induce traders to
clear trades within the CH. In particular, we demonstrate that, under certain conditions, a
CH would not be viable if restricted to OTC trades but would become feasible if allowed to
operate in both markets.
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1 − βnδ(n), (24)
where p = (1−η)[σu−τ]+ησc is the price for OTC transactions. The balance adjustments
are given by
Lt+n = ¯ Lt+n = Bt+n = ¯ Bt+n = −δ(n) + αγc + (1 − α)γp,
Kt+n = Lt+n + c,
¯ Kt+n = Lt+n + p.
It is instructive to discuss condition (24) further. The left-hand side is a weighted average
of the surplus that the CH can extract from traders in order to cover its settlement costs
without inducing default. The weights reﬂect the relative size of exchange versus OTC
20trades. Note that, in an exchange transaction, the CH can directly extract surplus from
traders. For OTC transactions, however, the CH can only extract the cost-saving oﬀered by
deferred settlement through the CH (condition (22)).
This is important to understand when a joint CH is optimal. Suppose, for example, that
the cost advantage oﬀered by a CH is not high enough to make clearing of OTC trades
feasible. A CH that clears trades in an exchange can then extract surplus to cross-subsidize
the clearing of OTC transactions. This is ex-ante eﬃcient (i.e., before traders learn where
they have to transact), as it saves on overall clearing costs. Interestingly, subsidizing OTC
trades is necessary since individual traders in these markets do not take into account the
positive externality from clearing through the CH. This can be summarized as follows.23










Finally, certain features of the OTC market predict whether it is possible for a CH
to cross-subsidize transactions across markets. Prices in OTC transactions vary with the
relative beneﬁts generated by such transactions. However, prices also depend on whether
certain traders have a large bargaining power. OTC transactions are often highly specialized
and, hence, create a large surplus for some traders. In addition, dealers in such markets might
have considerable market power when writing contracts. In our model, as OTC transactions
become more valuable, the price in OTC transactions increases. Similarly, our model predicts
that the larger the bargaining power of sellers, the larger the negotiated price as they can
extract more of the surplus from the transaction. Under these circumstances, clearing OTC
transactions becomes more diﬃcult for the CH. Formally, it is straightforward to show the
following.
23Using the 2009 annual report by Goldman Sachs (GS), back-of-the-envelope calculations imply that
settlement costs represent a non-negligible 8.5 percent of GS’s proﬁt margin in 2008. GS’s proﬁt margin in
2008 was 10 times larger than the minimum level necessary to avoid default. Of course, GS was probably
one of the better performing member of the DTCC. Still, the fact that GS’s proﬁt margin is relatively large
compared with the default proﬁt margin leads us to conclude that there is potential for cross-subsidization.
21Corollary 8. Suppose βnu−c ≥
δ(n)
γ . Given clearing costs (τ,δ), an optimal PS with cross-
subsidization exists if and only if α ≥ α(σ,η). Furthermore, the critical value α increases
with the surplus created in OTC transactions, σ, and with the bargaining power of sellers,
(1 − η).
4 Liquidity and Incentives
Our model naturally captures the fact that infrequent settlement through a CH increases
the potential for default. Of course, less frequent settlement economizes on settlement costs.
Indeed, as pointed out earlier, this feature links the frequency of settlement to higher levels
of liquidity. We now turn to the question of how to optimally balance such costs against the
higher default exposure associated with less frequent settlement. To simplify the analysis,
we now set α = 0.
Conditional on achieving an eﬃcient transaction size (q∗), an optimal payment system
should minimize the incurred costs from settlement. The CH must then choose the maximum
length of the transaction stage that is compatible with optimality, given the costs, δ, as
expressed by condition (20). Such an n exists as long as δ ≤ γ(βu − c). Note also that, if
n is large enough, we have that βnu < c. Thus, if settlement is suﬃciently infrequent, the
participation constraint of a trader that bought n times in a row will be violated. In other
words, there exists a maximum n such that condition (20) is satisﬁed.
However, our analysis so far has not studied the issue how the length of the settlement
cycle interacts with the optimal transaction size. We turn to this question next.
4.1 Settlement Frequency and Transaction Size
It is widely recognized that actual payment systems involve liquidity costs for participants
who hold reserves in the system. Hence, clearinghouses often make provisions, such as
oﬀering short-term credit facilities, in order to economize on such costs. Oﬀering credit,
however, is not without its own costs since it might increase default risk in the system. In
22this section, we use our model to study the trade-oﬀ between liquidity creation and default.
So far in our analysis, we termed a PS optimal if it decentralizes the eﬃcient amount
of asset exchange, q∗, in all transactions. In the presence of settlement costs, however, an
optimal PS might need to explore the trade-oﬀ between reducing the size of transactions
versus lengthening the transaction stage. We now turn to the more general problem of
determining jointly the eﬃcient settlement frequency and the eﬃcient transaction size.
We assume that δ ≤ γ(βu − c), and that settlement costs are small enough, so that it
is optimal for settlement to occur eventually. Based on our earlier ﬁndings, since α = 0, we
assume that the cost δ is shared equally across all participants, and that it is covered by
production in the settlement stage. In the Appendix we use a continuous-time formulation
of our model to set up the problem of jointly choosing settlement frequency and transaction
size. In order for the constraint set to be convex, it is suﬃcient that the cost function c(q)
is log-convex. Under this assumption, we derive the following.
Proposition 9. Assume that c(q) is log-convex. Any optimal PS implies that qt = ˆ q < q∗,
for all t. Furthermore, as δ increases, the optimal transaction size, ˆ q, as well as the optimal
length of the settlement cycle, ˆ T, decreases.
The ﬁrst part of the Proposition conﬁrms our intuition. Given that q∗ can be decen-
tralized, we already established in the previous section that we must optimally reduce the
extensive margin – i.e., the settlement frequency – as much as possible in order to econo-
mize on settlement costs. But it is also optimal to economize further on settlement costs by
reducing the intensive margin – i.e., the transaction size – below its ﬁrst-best level. This is
equivalent to reducing market participants’ exposures prior to the settlement stage by impos-
ing a tighter cap on the total number of contracts that can be exchanged. Notwithstanding,
it is still optimal to have a ﬁxed transaction size across trades and across time.
The second part of the Proposition is somewhat surprising. It asserts that as a response
to an increase in settlement costs, an optimal PS must adjust both ˆ q and ˆ T in the same
direction. In other words, it must reduce the volume of balance adjustments that need to be
settled in two complementary ways: shorten the length of the transaction stage and reduce
23the transaction size. The explanation for this is as follows. The binding constraint is the
participation constraint of a trader that has made the most purchases during the transaction
stage and, as a result, has to settle a large negative balance. An increase in δ makes it
more likely that this constraint will be violated. Hence, in order to avoid default, we must
decrease the potential exposure of this trader by reducing his negative balance adjustments.
This involves reducing both the quantity produced as well as the time between settlement
periods.
5 Discussion
There is an on-going policy discussion on whether the introduction of clearing arrangements
in OTC markets will lead to superior outcomes. In this paper we used mechanism design to
analyze the optimal organization of clearing across markets. This approach abstracts from
certain characteristics of the CH, such as its ownership and its governance structure. In
reality CHs are often operated in conjunction with a particular market or trading engine,
thus reﬂecting a basic natural monopoly arising from increasing returns within the market
or trading environment. If a CH operates as a monopoly, it is commonly either user-owned –
i.e., it maximizes the beneﬁts of its users –, or it is regulated to recover costs. In some cases,
there is limited competition between CHs where one provider is public while other providers
might be private.24 In such cases, the public system is usually required to recover its costs
in order to ensure “fair” competition.25 We believe that this evidence supports our basic
modelling approach of studying a planner’s problem, where all eﬃciency gains are passed on
to traders, but additional subsidization from outside the trading environment is not feasible.
At the very least, our model can be considered as normative, in other words, as identifying
the rules under which optimal payment systems should operate.
Settlement costs are often neglected when looking at ﬁnancial trades. One can argue that
24An example is the European clearing landscape where the ECB is currently developing an alterna-
tive clearing and settlement engine, Target2S, for cross-border trading. This system is expected to be in
competition with existing private providers.
25For example, the (publicly operated) Fedwire is required to break even.
24these include not only operational costs related to clearing and settling a transaction, but
also, and perhaps more importantly, the opportunity costs of holding liquidity in order to
settle. One should interpret our settlement costs in this broad sense. We do not take a stance
in this paper on the relative size of costs between the two diﬀerent modes of settlement (τ
vs. δ). Nonetheless, we capture their essential diﬀerences. One refers to a per transaction
cost, while the other is a total (average) cost. This distinction oﬀers a straightforward way
of incorporating increasing returns in clearing through a CH.
On the surface, direct operational costs seem quantitatively small, being in the order of
a few cents per transaction. However, these add up over a typical transaction cycle taking
place over a few days, as the volume of transactions can be very large.26 More importantly,
there are considerable ﬁxed costs and costs for auxiliary services (such as custody fees) that
are associated with being a member of a clearinghouse.27
Moreover, as pointed out earlier, one should also consider costs that are related to the in-
house costs of settlement – related to the operation of a back-oﬃce and, more signiﬁcantly,
to the necessity to either hold liquid reserves for settlement, or to obtain such liquidity
through costly short-term borrowing (e.g., in overnight markets). All these considerations
make settlement costs a non-negligible issue for the organization of clearing across markets.
Finally, in order to concentrate on the role of diﬀerential information on clearing trades,
we have abstracted from some interesting features of payments. Using SRPS is an obvious
limitation, but it greatly sharpens the analysis. Similarly, a CH can rely on other risk
management techniques (such as collateral requirements) in order to control their default
exposure. Another short-coming of our analysis is that traders are assumed to have deep
pockets that allow them to settle their obligations. Instead, we could introduce a trade-oﬀ
by letting traders with extreme positions default, while lengthening the settlement cycle and,
hence, saving on settlement costs. Incorporating positive levels of equilibrium default is a
diﬃcult, but interesting, extension which we leave for future research.
26Indirect evidence on their importance is the heated discussion in Europe over the last few years concerning
the reduction of cross-border settlement costs.
27For an example of such fees see the DTCC fee guide (DTCC (2009)).
256 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 3
We ﬁrst show that all other participation constraints hold, if the one for the worst possible
adjustment up to transaction stage n holds. To facilitate the exposition, we concentrate on
the case where α = 1. The arguments for the case where α < 1 are analogous.
Having normalized b dt = 0 for all t, the participation constraint for an optimal payment
system at t + n − 1 gives
f(Xt+n−1) + βEt+n−1[vt+n(dt+n−2 + Xt+n−1)]
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which is the participation constraint associated with adjustment X in the last transactions
round. The last inequality follows since Xmin ≤ 0, and since we require that the CH must
break even; i.e., E[Xt+n] = −δ(n). Hence, the participation constraints at t + n − 1 hold,
provided that they hold for t + n. By induction, it follows that they also hold for any t + s,
s = 1,...,n − 2.
26Next, for the incentive constraints, we have that
f(Xt+s) + βEt+s[vt+s+1(dt+s−1 + Xt+s)] ≥ f(Bt+s) + g(Xt+s) + βEt+s[vt+s+1(dt+s−1 + Bt+s)].
(25)
Solving for the function vt+s+1 and using the linearity of V , we obtain
f(Xt+s) + β
n−sXt+s ≥ f(Bt+s) + g(Xt+s) + β
n−sBt+s. (26)
Finally, using the fact that g and f do not depend on time, we obtain
f(Xt+n) + Xt+n ≥ f(Bt+n) + g(Xt+n) + Bt+n. (27)
The result then follows if we set g(X) = 0 for transactions in the exchange.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Using the fact that f(B) = 0 and V0 = 0 (since here there is no OTC market), we obtain
the following constraints for an optimal payment system
−c + Kt+n ≥ Bt+n, (28)







t+s) ≥ 0, (30)





t+s + Xt+n) ≥ 0, (31)
27for all Xt+n ∈ {Lt+n,Kt+n,Bt+n}. In addition, we have the following break-even condition
for the CH:
γ (Kt+n + Lt+n) + (1 − 2γ)Bt+n = −δ(n). (32)
We need to solve for the PS that fulﬁls these equations for the largest set of parameters. This
is a well-deﬁned linear program under inequality constraints. Notice that the ﬁrst incentive
constraint must be binding at the solution. If not, the second binds and we would have
Lt+n < Bt+n < Kt+n. But, we can then increase Lt+n and reduce the other adjustments so
as to still satisfy all constraints. Hence, the ﬁrst incentive constraint must bind and we have
that Kt+n = Bt+n + c. This implies immediately that Bt+n = Lt+n.
Using these facts and the break even condition for the CH, we obtain
γc + Lt+n = −δ(n). (33)
We can now use the default constraint in the settlement stage and the participation con-
straints to characterize the set of parameters for which an optimal payment system exists.
Again, by the linearity of V and the fact that Kt+n = Lt+n + c, all constraints hold if and
only if the trader with the worst possible adjustment does not have an incentive to default
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1 − βn. (36)
This completes the proof.
286.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Since α = 0, the value of trading outside the CH is now given by only trading OTC, or,
(1 − β)V0 = γ (σ(u − c) − τ). Using the linearity of V (X), the fact that f( ¯ B) = 0, and the
expressions for g, we obtain the following incentive constraints
−σc − (1 − η)[σ(u − c) − τ] + ¯ Kt+n ≥ ¯ Bt+n, (37)
σu − η[σ(u − c) − τ] + ¯ Lt+n ≥ ¯ Bt+n. (38)






t+s) ≥ βV0, (39)
and





t+s + Xt+n) ≥ g (Xt+n) + βV0, (40)
for all X. In addition, we again have the following break-even condition for the CH:
γ
¡ ¯ Kt+n + ¯ Lt+n
¢
+ (1 − 2γ) ¯ Bt+n = −δ(n). (41)
We again want to solve for the payment system that fulﬁls these equations for the largest set
of parameters. By a similar argument as in the previous Proposition, only the ﬁrst incentive
constraint binds. Hence, ¯ Bt+n = ¯ Lt+n, and
¯ Kt+n = ¯ Bt+n + (1 − η)[σu − τ] + ησc. (42)
Using these results in the break-even condition for the CH, we obtain:
¯ Lt+n + γ [(1 − η)[σu − τ] + ησc] = −δ(n). (43)
29Again, it is straightforward to verify that the payment system is incentive feasible if and
only if the trader with the worst possible balance adjustment has no incentive to default in
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Using the expression for ¯ Lt+n and the fact that we are studying a SRPS, this expression can
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which completes the proof.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 6
With α ∈ (0,1), we now have two sets of incentive, participation and default constraints.
Furthermore, the value of default changes to
(1 − β)V0 = γ(1 − α)[σ(u − c) − τ],
reﬂecting the total size of the OTC market. It is also straightforward to verify from the
incentive constraints that ¯ Bt+n = Bt+n. Using this fact and that f(Bt+n) = 0, we have the
following incentive constraints:
−σc − (1 − η)[σ(u − c) − τ] + ¯ Kt+n ≥ Bt+n, (47)
σu − η[σ(u − c) − τ] + ¯ Lt+n ≥ Bt+n, (48)
−c + Kt+n ≥ Bt+n, (49)
u + Lt+n ≥ Bt+n. (50)
30Finally, the break even condition for the CH is now given by
γ
£
α(Kt+n + Lt+n) + (1 − α)
¡ ¯ Kt+n + ¯ Lt+n
¢¤
+ (1 − 2γ)Bt+n = −δ(n). (51)
Again, for the largest set of parameters for which an optimal PS exists, it must be the
case that ¯ Lt+n = Lt+n = Bt+n < Kt+n, Bt+n < ¯ Kt+n and
¯ Kt+n = Lt+n + (1 − η)[σu − τ] + ησc (52)
Kt+n = Lt+n + c. (53)
These balance adjustments imply that we only have to consider the no-default constraint in
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(54)
¿From the break-even condition, we obtain
Lt+n = −δ(n) + αγc + (1 − α)γ [ησc + (1 − η)(σu − τ)]. (55)
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1 − βnδ(n), (58)
which completes the proof.
316.5 Proof of Proposition 9
In order to demonstrate Proposition 9, we ﬁnd it convenient to use diﬀerential calculus. To
this end, here we develop a continuous-time version of the model in the text. We assume
that buying and selling opportunities follow a Poisson process with arrival rate γ. The (con-
tinuous) rate of time preference is now denoted by ρ. The ﬁxed cost, δ, is incurred whenever
the transaction process stops and settlement occurs. This occurs after a deterministic inter-
val of length T. As before, we denote balance adjustments by (K(t),L(t),B(t)). All other
assumptions remain the same as in the text.
We let the random time before the next arrival of a trading opportunity be denoted by
τ. In that case, τ has a distribution function given by
F (t) = Pr(τ ≤ t) = 1 − Pr(τ > t) = 1 − e
−γt. (59)
Hence, the time until the next arrival of a trading opportunity is an exponentially distributed
random variable with distribution function F (t) = 1 − e−γt.
Denote by V0 the expected future payoﬀ for a trader at the end of the settlement stage.
It is straightforward to show that an optimal PS involves a constant level of transactions.
First, assume that there are no settlement costs. Since both consumption and production
















(u(q) − c(q)). (61)
This is analogous to the lifetime utility under a system that employs a threat of exclusion
in the discrete-time version of the model presented in the text. In the absence of settlement
32costs, equation (61) also gives the life-time expected payoﬀ in a system that decentralizes
transactions of size q.
When costly settlement occurs after each time length, T, it involves an aggregate (aver-






1 − e−ρT . (62)




(u(q) − c(q)) − δ
e−ρT
1 − e−ρT . (63)
As before, we deﬁne the adjustments conditional on the traders’ reports by
pKt − c(q) = pLt = pBt, (64)
for all t. Also, since the PS is repeated, we have that adjustments, X, satisfy
XnT+t = Xe
ρ(T−t), (65)
for all t ∈ [nT;(n+1)T], where n is an integer. As in the discrete-time case, the above implies
that all incentive constraints are fulﬁlled. In addition, it satisﬁes all PCs for the largest set
of parameter values. Next, we derive the market clearing condition for the settlement stage.
This is accomplished by approximating total balance adjustments in an interval of length T.
First, note that the probability of having exactly n arrivals of trading opportunities in the
interval [0,t] is given by




For small ∆, we then have that
P[N∆ = 1] ≈ γ∆, (67)
33where P[N∆ > 1] = o(∆). Next, deﬁne ∆ = T
m, where m ∈ [0,T] is an integer. The total
adjustment for sellers over an interval of length T is then approximately given by





















As ∆ → 0, a trader will almost surely receive either none or one opportunity to trade during
a time length ∆. In that case, using L’Hˆ opital’s rule,28 the expected total adjustments for






. The expected total balance adjustments for buyers are






. Finally, expected balance adjustments for
traders who have received no trading opportunities over this time interval can be determined
as follows. For each interval of length ∆, a measure 2γ∆ of traders are engaged in transactions
(γ∆ of them as buyers and γ∆ as sellers). Therefore, the measure of traders who are not
involved in any transactions over an interval of length ∆ is (1 − 2γ)∆. As a result, the
aggregate balance adjustments for non-trading activities over the interval of length T are
given by

















[γpK + γpL + (1 − 2γ)pB] = −δ. (70)


















The worst possible balance adjustment is assigned to traders that either never traded or never
















(u(q) − c(q)) − δ
e−ρT
1 − e−ρT ≥ 0. (72)
This constraint is identical to the one in the discrete-time version, simply adjusting for the
continuous time discount factor. Given these adjustments, an optimal PS chooses q and T
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The objective function expresses the discounted lifetime utility of a representative partici-
pant. The second constraint summarizes the PC that is potentially binding, while the third
constraint summarizes the IC and the market clearing conditions that must be satisﬁed in
any incentive feasible outcome. The equality in the last equation follows from the fact that
the PS works for the largest set of parameters if it makes all incentive constraints exactly























The objective function is strictly concave in (q,T). In order to guarantee that the constraint
set is convex, we need an additional assumption. Given any T (q), the function on the
left-hand side of the above inequality is concave in q (T). However, the left-hand side is not
necessarily jointly concave in (q,T) due to the second term, which is a product of two convex
functions. A function is log-convex if its natural logarithm is convex. We have the following
suﬃcient condition for the constraint set to be convex.29
Lemma 10. Suppose that c(q) is log-convex. Then eρTc(q) is a strictly convex function in
(q,T), and the constraint set is convex.




(c(q))2 > 0. (76)
The ﬁrst term of the left-hand side in equation (74) is strictly concave in q, while the right-












2 > 0. (78)
Hence, as c(q) is log-convex, eρTc(q) is convex. The result follows since the sum of two
concave functions is concave.
Taking ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to q and T, we obtain the following character-
29A weaker condition is given by − 1
eρT u00(q)c(q) ≥ c02 − c00(q)c(q).



























where λ is the multiplier on the single constraint. This leads us to the following.
Lemma 11. Let c(q) be log-convex. For any optimal PS with settlement, we have ˆ q < q∗.
Proof. Since δ, γ, and ρ are positive, and the optimal settlement length is ﬁnite ( ˆ T ∈ (0,∞)),
we must have that λ > 0. Hence, equation (79) implies that u0(ˆ q) − c0(ˆ q) > 0. Since c is
increasing and strictly convex, and u is increasing and strictly concave, this implies that
ˆ q < q∗.














This condition, together with the constraint (74), characterizes the solution (ˆ q, ˆ T). Solving

























A solution to the last equation exists by the Intermediate-Value-Theorem. Furthermore, any
solution must lay in an interval [q,q∗], where q > 0. The problem is that the left-hand side of
equation (83) is non-monotonic. Hence, there will, in general, be more than one solution to
this equation. The optimal solution, however, corresponds to the one closest to (and below)
37q∗. The next Proposition relies solely on the fact that at this solution, ˆ q, the left-hand side
of equation (83) is locally strictly decreasing.
Lemma 12. Assume that c(q) is log-convex. As the settlement cost, δ, increases, the optimal
transaction size, ˆ q, as well as the optimal length of the transactions stage, ˆ T, decrease.
Proof. We establish ﬁrst that ˆ q and ˆ T move in the same direction; i.e., that d ˆ T
dˆ q > 0. Diﬀer-




















which is strictly positive, as u is strictly increasing and strictly concave, while c is log-convex.
Next, we show that ˆ q is decreasing in δ. Denote the left-hand side of equation (83) by

































































∂q < 0, or, equivalently, the left-hand side of equation (83) is strictly decreasing for
q suﬃciently close to q∗. Furthermore, Γ(q) converges to 0 as q → q∗. Hence, Γ(q) > 0 for q
suﬃciently close to q∗ and, by the continuity of Γ(q), there must exist a solution to equation
38(83) for small enough δ > 0. Finally, since Γ(q) ↓ 0 as q → q∗, we must have that Γ0(ˆ q) ≤ 0
(with Γ having possibly a local maximum at ˆ q). This completes the proof.
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